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URBAN HOMESTEADING IN THE FRONTIER
OF THE AMERICAN CITY
The word "homestead" usually brings to mind either the
exemption given a family to protect its residence from cred-
itors1 or the exemption of a certain portion of the value of a
home from local property taxes. 2 A new type of homesteading,
modeled after the federal Homestead Act of 1862,3 is now
encouraging occupancy and development of abandoned hous-
ing as a means of renovating inner city areas. The city, for a
token fee, transfers to a family of homesteaders an aban-
doned house acquired through tax delinquency proceedings,
lien foreclosure, gift, or otherwise. After a specified number of
years, the city grants full ownership if the transferee meets
certain conditions, such as continuous occupancy and re-
habilitation. This comment will discuss urban homesteading
as a remedy for abandonment of urban structures and will
examine the legal foundation for such a program in Louisi-
ana.
The Abandonment Process
The abandoned shells of buildings litter the central areas
of many American cities because owners often find abandon-
ing their property more economical than paying taxes and
keeping it repaired. 4 The complex abandonment process be-
gins with psychological and fiscal abandoment long before
owners actually desert their derelict urban property.5
Normally, the abandonment of individual properties is a
predictable and desirable incident in the housing cycle. A
filtering process occurs in which upper income families oc-
cupy newly constructed dwellings, leaving vacant their older
homes which are claimed by families living in less desirable
structures.6 Vacancies are thus created for families from even
1. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 9 (provides an exemption of at least $15,000).
2. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 20(A)(1).
3. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§
161-302 (1970).
4. Sternlieb, Abandoned Housing: What is to be Done?, URBAN LAND,
Mar. 1972 at 3 [hereinafter cited as Sternlieb].
5. Testimony of Urbanologist Dr. George Sternlieb, Subcommittee on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 Housing and Urban Development Legislation of
1970, 850 (Comm. Print 1970).
6. See F. PENNANCE, HOUSING MARKET ANALYSIS AND PoucY 21 (1969);
Sternlieb at 6.
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lower socio-economic levels who abandon the most undesir-
able housing. Under optimum conditions, the abandoned prop-
erty becomes a prime area for new construction. Recently,
however, the swift increase in abandonment and its en-
croachment into new areas has disrupted the cycle in several
cities, and as a result, many structurally sound dwellings are
left uninhabited.7
The Urban Homesteading Program
Existing programs, either created by municipal ordinance
setting up a special urban homesteading board 8 or developed
within an existing city housing department,9 have varying
qualifications for homesteading. However, the regulations fol-
low a general pattern and include requirements that the
applicant be of a minimum age,10 be the head of a family,"
and demonstrate he has financial resources sufficient to pay
another to remodel the structure, or that he possesses the
necessary building trade skills to do the work himself.12 The
city conveys the property by a conditional fee, subject to the
requirement that the homesteader rehabilitate the proper-
ty,1 3 which matures into a fee simple after a specified period
of occupancy.1 4 Additionally, the city often requires submis-
7. See Edson, Housing Abandonment-The Problem and a Proposed Solu-
tion, 7 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 382 (1972). See also G. STERNLIEB AND R.
BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TENEMENT LANDLORD RE-
VISITED xii (1973).
8. Philadelphia, Pa., and Wilmington, Del., created a homesteading board
by ordinance. PHILADELPHIA, PA., ORDINANCE 543, July 20, 1973 [hereinafter
cited as PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCE]; WILMINGTON, DEL., CITY CODE ch. 33A
(1973) [hereinafter cited as WILMINGTON ORDINANCE]. Each ordinance
creates an urban homesteading board appointed by the mayor. PHILADEL-
PHIA ORDINANCE § 2 (eleven members with two city councilmen, and one from
each of the following groups: architects, contractors, members of the building
trades council, the clergy, savings and loan association representatives and
the general public); WILMINGTON ORDINANCE §§ 7, 8 (three to five members).
9. The Baltimore urban homesteading program developed from an exist-
ing rehabilitation loan program rather than being created by a separate
ordinance. See Comment, Homesteading 1974: Reclaiming Abandoned Houses
on the Urban Frontier, 10 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 416, 425 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Homesteading '74].
10. PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCE § 6(E)(1); WILMINGTON ORDINANCE § 4(1).
11. Id.
12. Id. at § 6(E)(3); WILMINGTON ORDINANCE at § 4(3).
13. Id. at § 6(D); WILMINGTON ORDINANCE at § 4(4)(d).
14. PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCE § 6(E)(5) (five years); WILMINGTON ORDI-
NANCE § 4(4)(d) (three years).
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sion to frequent inspections to determine if the homesteader
is improving the property in a satisfactory manner.15
Acquisition of Homestead Structures
Tax sales, whereby the city utilizes local procedures and
obtains title to property on which taxes have been unpaid for
a specified period of time,I6 provide one means of acquiring
homesteading properties. 17 However, statutory redemption
periods, 8 providing the original owner an opportunity to re-
deem his title through payment of delinquent taxes, cause
delays in transfer of full title to the city. Vandalism and
deterioration can increase during the interim vacancy, 19 and
unless the redemption periods are drastically shortened, re-
duce the effectiveness of programs acquiring prospective
homestead properties through tax sales. 20
An alternative to tax foreclosure procedures is a receiv-
ership program in which the city assumes operation of ne-
glected rental properties. 21 The receiver performs necessary
repairs and the city acquires a foreclosable lien on the prop-
erty for the costs; in the interim, initial rehabilitation of the
building prevents further dilapidation.
To prevent irreversible deterioration of potential home-
steading properties, local authorities might acquire title by
purchase, eminent domain proceedings, or public nuisance
action. 22 Whereas the purchase method encourages exorbi-
tant rises in the asking price of suitable structures, 23 eminent
15. WILMINGTON ORDINANCE § 4(4)(b). See federal inspection require-
ments in text at notes 34-38, infra.
16. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 § 5860.101 (Supp. 1974); MASS. ANN.
LAWS, vol. 2-A, ch. 60 § 37 (1971).
17. Homesteading '74 at 428.
18. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 § 5860.501 (Supp. 1974) (one year after
notice of delinquency before sale, but no redemption after sale); MASS. ANN.
LAWS, vol. 2-A, ch. 60 § 65 (1971) (two years).
19. Nachbaur, Empty Houses: Abandoned Residential Buildings in the
Inner City, 17 HOw. L.J. 1, 11 (1971).
20. The period in Boston was reduced to six months. MASS. ANN. LAWS,
vol. 2-A, ch. 60 § 65 (1971) as amended by MASS. LAW 716, § 1 (Aug. 26, 1971).
21. Mann, Receivership of Problem Buildings in New York City and its
Potential for Decent Housing of the Poor, 9 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 309
(1973).
22. See N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS, Bk. 49 1/2 § 1970-74 (McKinney 1973).
23. Sternlieb, Abandonment and Rehabilitation: What is to be Done?
House Committee on Banking and Currency, Papers Submitted to the Sub-
committee on Housing Panels on Housing Production, Housing Demand, and
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domain proceedings, which provide for a judicial determina-
tion of value, do not. However, some courts have viewed the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as limiting
acquisition by eminent domain to expropriations for a public
purpose.24 Courts have found a valid public purpose in urban
renewal so long as the public benefit clearly outweighs any
incidental private gain.25 The problem raised by urban
homesteading is whether the public benefit of an improved
neighborhood sufficiently outweighs the obvious benefit to
the homesteader who receives the property.
No cases weigh the precise considerations involved in a
homesteading situation; however, urban renewal cases
finding sufficient public purpose even when the property
taken was to be developed by and for private interests may
provide guidelines. 26 In Berman v. Parker,27 the United
States Supreme Court broadly defined "public purpose" to
include programs for a better balanced and more attractive
community, 2s in effect equating the public purpose require-
ment with the public welfare requirement of the police
power.29 Using similar reasoning, the Fourth Circuit upheld a
Puerto Rican law under which any private property, urban or
rural, could be taken for the general economic reconstruction
of the island.30
Given these broad constitutional boundaries, state courts
have usually accepted a legislative determination that urban
renewal programs fulfill a public purpose. 31 A requirement
that one opposed to the taking of the property prove that the
Developing a Suitable Living Environment, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 315, 367
(Comm. Print 1971).
24. E.g., Wright v. Walcott, 238 Mass. 432, 131 N.E. 291 (1921).
25. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
26. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Schneider v. District of
Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953); Housing and Redevelopment Au-
thority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96 N.W.2d 673 (1959).
27. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
28. The public purpose in Berman was defined to include public welfare
in its broadest sense of having a beautiful, spacious, and well-balanced com-
munity as well as one which is healthy, clean, and carefully patrolled. 348
U.S. at 33.
29. M. DAKIN AND M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 23 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as DAKIN & KLEIN].
. 30. People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (1st
Cir. 1946).
31. E.g., City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., 173 La. 71, 136 So.
91 (1931). See also DAKIN & KLEIN at 24 for additional examples.
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private benefit outweighs the public gain has resulted in few
challenges to urban renewal expropriation being successful.
3 2
Because public purpose is an evolving concept, it seems un-
likely that many courts will prohibit the eminent domain
method of acquisition. The small expenditure involved in giv-
ing away unmarketable property to rehabilitate entire
neighborhoods creates numerous benefits ranging from lower
crime rates and safer streets to an increase in the overall tax
base of the city.
A final method of acquiring property for homesteading is
from the federal government. For example, Philadelphia's
first homesteading project included fourteen homes which the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had
conveyed to the city under the Local Property Release Option
Program.33 An experimental program authorized by the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 allows the
transfer of property from HUD to any municipal homestead
agency. 34 The local programs must meet federal guidelines
which include provisions for periodic inspections of home-
steading progress and coordinated plans for upgrading com-
munity services and facilities.
3 5
Transfer of Title to the Homesteader
Under most homestead programs, the city conveys the
property by conditional fee with a power of termination in the
event of noncompliance with any condition of the homestead-
ing agreement. 36 Under one proposal the city transfers all
homesteading properties to an independent non-profit corpo-
ration which leases the houses to the homesteaders for five
years at a one dollar yearly rental. 37 Transfer of full owner-
ship occurs upon fulfillment of all the conditions. 38
Financing
Availability of money for rehabilitation varies according
to the income level of the participants. Even in programs
32. In re Bruce Ave., 430 Pa. 498, 505, 266 A.2d 96, 99 (1970).
33. HUD CHALLENGE, September 1974, at 15.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1974).
35. Id.
36. The homesteader in states other than Louisiana receives a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent.
37. See Homesteading '74 at 443.
38. See WILMINGTON ORDINANCE § 6.
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which are not primarily aimed at providing housing for low
income families many homesteaders will be from such groups,
since perhaps only the poor will be willing to return to many
of the neighborhoods abandoned. 39 Without financial assis-
tance, these people will be excluded, leaving those sufficiently
affluent to find housing in a better environment as the un-
likely but only possible participants. Though few banks will-
ingly invest in slum areas where property values deteriorate
rapidly,40 prescreening of lower middle and middle class
families with a high likelihood of success in homestead re-
habilitation has encouraged some banks to make unsecured
loans to homesteaders.4 1
City or state bond issues to finance mortgages and federal
loans under the loan program of Section 312 of the National
Housing Act 42 provide possible sources of financing.43 Under
Section 312 homeowners receive three percent loans, up to a
maximum of $12,000, for terms of up to twenty years.44
Homesteaders are eligible for these loans, which may be used
to bring the property up to building code standards. 45
Subsidies or grants in addition to rehabilitation loans
may be required. One danger of urban homesteading is that
the homesteader may be required to invest capital for the
repair of his home in an amount far in excess of its reason-
able potential market value. If, after spending $15,000 for re-
habilitation, the homesteader can neither sell nor mortgage
the property for more than $10,000, the city will benefit, but
39. Sengstock & Sengstock, Homeownership: A Goal for All Americans, 46
J. URBAN L. 313 (1969). See McClaughry, The Troubled Dream: The Life and
Times of § 235, 6 LOY. L. REV. (Chicago) 1, 25-30 (1975).
40. See Phillips and Bryson, Refinancing: A First Step Toward a Realistic
Housing Program for the Poor, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 835 (1971).
41. The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 1. See also text at
note 106, infra; Homesteading '74 at 444.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (1970).
43. For a discussion of the operation of state housing finance agencies
see Committee on Housing and Urban Development, Subcommittee on State
and Local Housing Development Legislation and Programs, Development of
State Housing Finance Agencies, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 471 (1974).
Louisiana has enacted legislation creating a state housing finance agency,
but no funding has yet been provided. LA. R.S. 40:581-600 (Supp. 1973).
44. The maximum amount can be increased up to 45 per cent in desig-
nated areas of high cost. 42 U.S.C. § 1452(b)(c)(3), (4) (1970); 12 U.S.C. §
1715(k)(hX2) (1974).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1452(b) as amended by the Housing and Community De-
velopment Act of 1974 § 116(e)(2).
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the program will attract few participants. 46 Section 106 of the
National Housing Act 47 provides a limited source for such a
subsidy; however, the income restrictions contained therein
will hinder the use of this program, and a more comprehen-
sive scheme should be considered. 4
Homesteading in Louisiana
Louisiana cities developing urban homesteading pro-
grams face many unique problems. Basic to most programs is a
conditional transfer of property allowing enforcement of the
obligation to rehabilitate. Although Louisiana does not rec-
ognize the common law concept of a conditional fee,49 a sale
subject to a right of redemption affords a similar enforcement
device. 50 The Proposed Homesteading Ordinance, City of New
Orleans, the first homesteading ordinance to be considered by
a local authority in the state, apparently relies on this de-
vice. 51
Under the New Orleans Proposal, the homesteader re-
ceives the property for one dollar plus rehabilitation obliga-
tions. 52 Treating the transfer as a sale presents difficulty in
meeting the requirement of Civil Code article 2464 that the
46. See statement of Professor William Grigsby quoted in The Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1466 (1970).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1466(c) (Supp. 1975) (Up to $3,500 is provided to home-
owners with a family income of under $3,500 if it can be shown the grant will
enable the homeowner to bring his house up to building code standards).
49. 1 A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY §§ 3, 6 in 2. LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 6, 12-13 (1966); Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So.
666 (1923) (full ownership and servitude are the only two estates in land
recognized by the LA. CIV. CODE).
50. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2566-88. "The right of redemption is an agree-
ment or paction, by which the vendor reserves to himself the power of taking
back the thing sold by returning the price paid for it." LA. CIV. CODE art.
2567.
51. "[F]ailure or refusal of the applicant to fulfill and/or comply with ...
conditions shall give the agency the right to rescind the sale and reacquire
the property, all in accordance with applicable Louisiana law." Proposed
Homesteading Ordinance, City of New Orleans § 5 [hereinafter cited as New
Orleans Proposal], a copy of which is on file in the offices of the Louisiana
Law Review.
52. Such obligations include meeting building code standards within
eighteen months, residence in structure for three years, allowance of periodic
inspections, payment of property taxes, and maintenance of flood and fire
insurance with extended coverage for vandalism and malicious mischief. New
Orleans Proposal § 5.
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sale price must "not be out of all proportion with the value of
the thing." Courts have interpreted article 2464 as requiring
that the price be fairly equivalent to the value.53 When the
property is essentially unmarketable, as is the usual case, a
transfer for a nominal sum might not be considered out of all
proportion to the value. However, if the property has some
market value, the equivalency requirement will probably not
be met, since the obligations assumed by the homesteader
cannot be considered as part of the price-the price in a sale
must be certain54 and consist of a sum of money.55
A possible solution is to term the transfer an innominate
contract, which is subject only to the general principles of the
law of obligations. 56 Louisiana courts have upheld as innomi-
nate contracts transfers in which a portion of the cause or
consideration was services or other advantages to the grant-
or,57 thus the obligations assumed by the homesteader
should be adequate. If neither the requirements for an in-
nominate contract nor a sale are found, a Louisiana court
would probably find a disguised donation.5"
A final alternative under Louisiana law is to treat the
conveyance as an onerous donation. 59 The transfer could be
53. Blanchard v. Haber, 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928); Murray v. Barn-
hart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906); Northeast La. Detachment of Marine
Corps League v. City of Monroe, 253 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971). Several
writers have criticized the doctrine of "serious consideration" because such
an interpretation reads the word "all" out of the phrase "out of all propor-
tion." See Snelling, Cause and Consideration in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV.
178, 209 (1934). There are four classifications of prices: (1) the insignificant
price, out of all proportion to the value of the thing; (2) the lesionary price; (3)
the just price, equivalent or in reasonable proportion to the value of the
thing; and (4) the conventional price, out of reasonable proportion to the
value of the thing, greater than the lesionary price, but less than the just
price. 8 TUL. L. REV. at 209-11.
54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2464.
55. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2439, 2464.
56. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1777-78. See 1 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 113 in
6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 197-98 (1969). But see Murray v. Barnhart,
117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906).
57. Kirk v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 51 La. Ann. 667, 25 So. 457 (1899);
Thielman v. Gahlman, 119 La. 350, 44 So. 123 (1907).
58. E.g., Succession of Daste, 254 La. 403, 223 So. 2d 848 (1969). "[T]he sale
of a plantation for a dollar could not be considered as a fair sale; it would be
considered as a donation disguised." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2464.
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1527: "The donor may impose on the donee any
charges or conditions he pleases, provided they contain nothing contrary to
law or good morals." Most cases involve gifts of land for a specified purpose
providing that if the donee fails to so use the land, it should revert to the
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made on the condition that the homesteader bring the struc-
ture up to building code standards within a certain amount of
time and live in the house for an even longer period of time.60
The transferring agency could also impose conditions provid-
ing for periodic inspections to determine if the property is
being rehabilitated in a satisfactory manner.6 1 Failure to
fulfill the conditions of the donation would result in revoca-
tion under Civil Code article 1559;62 fulfillment of the condi-
tions and completion of the occupancy period would result in
certification by the transferor that the conditions have been
met to clear title to the property.6 3
Constitutional Considerations
If the transfer of the homestead is considered an onerous
donation in Louisiana, the transferring municipality must
have the capacity to donate property. The Constitution of
1974 contains the following provision:
Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the
funds, credit, property, or things of value of the state or
of any political subdivision shall not be loaned, pledged,
or donated to or for any person, association, or corpora-
tion, public or private.6
The Housing Authority Act 6 5 authorizing municipalities to
invest funds in the bonds of housing authorities was chal-
donor. See, e.g., Segura Realty Co. v. Segura Sugar Co., 145 La. 510, 82 So. 684
(1919) (donation of land for a sugar refinery); Lawrence v. Police Jury, 35 La.
Ann. 601 (1883) (donation of land for use for parish purposes only). See
generally 1 L. OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 209 in 10
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 317 (1969).
60. See, e.g., New Orleans Proposal §§ 4(4)(b), (c).
61. See, e.g., WILMINGTON ORDINANCE § 4(4)(b); New Orleans Proposal §
4(d).
62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1559(3): "Donations inter vivos are liable to be
revoked or dissolved on account of the following causes: . . . (3) The nonper-
formance of the conditions imposed on the donee." A reversionary clause in
the act of donation would be unnecessary as all onerous donations contain an
implied resolutory condition. Board of Trustees v. Richardson, 216 La. 633, 44
So. 2d 321 (1949).
63. E.g., New Orleans Proposal § 6.
64. LA. CONST. art. 7 § 14(A). The prohibition might also apply to a lease
or sale which did not have a "serious consideration." Northeast La. Detach-
ment of Marine Corps League v. City of Monroe, 253 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1971) (decided under the Constitution of 1921). See text at notes 52-56,
supra.
65. LA. R.S. 40:381 (1950).
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lenged in State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority6 6 on the
basis of similar language in the Constitution of 1921,67 the
claim being made that such investments would be a prohib-
ited use of public funds to benefit a public corporation. The
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the statute, construing the
constitutional provision as requiring only that public expen-
ditures be for a public purpose.6 8 Viewing the construction of
public housing as a legitimate exercise of the police power,
the court found that the public purpose test was met.69
Despite practical differences between construction of
subsidized public housing and the donation of publicly owned
property in a homesteading program, an urban homesteading
program should meet the public purpose requirement as in-
terpreted in Porterie.70 In Porterie, the court found slums to
be breeding places for crime and that removing them would
benefit the entire city.7 1 Dilapidated and abandoned urban
houses today create similar conditions.7 2 As in Porterie, a
court could find a public purpose for the action of a municipal-
ity when it is within the general dimensions of the police
power-that is, when the action is taken to preserve the
health, morals, and safety of the inhabitants.
To exclude onerous donations from the scope of the con-
stitutional prohibition would be an alternative argument.
The constitutional language should be construed in light of
the codal division of donations into three categories: gratui-
tous, onerous, and remunerative.73 Onerous donations are not
subject to the rules governing inter vivos donations 74 and
66. 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938).
67. La. Const. art. 4 § 12 (1921).
68. "It is a public purpose for which the city's funds may be expended
and a public use for which private property may be taken in expropriation
proceedings." 190 La. at 727, 182 So. at 730.
69. "The framers of the Constitution did not intend to debar municipal
corporations from using public funds to protect the health, morals and safety
of all their inhabitants ..... " 190 La. at 734, 182 So. at 732.
70. Perhaps LA. CONST. art. 7 § 14(C) gives additional support for the
proposition that the prohibition on donation is inapplicable where there is a
sufficient public purpose to justify the governmental action. "For a public
purpose, the state and its political subdivisions or political corporations may
engage in cooperative endeavors with each other, with the United States or
its agencies, or with any public or private association, corporation, or indi-
vidual." LA. CONST. art. 7 § 14(C).
71. 190 La. at 733, 182 So. at 733.
72. STERNLIEB & BURCHELL at 149, note 7, supra.
73. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1523.
74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1526.
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should be treated as onerous transfers. 75 The debates of the
Constitutional Convention do not indicate that donations
other than gratuitous donations were considered as being
prohibited. 76 Urban renewal authorizations enacted under
the Constitution of 1921 indicate a similarly liberal interpre-
tation by the legislature of the similar prohibition contained
in the Constitution of 1921. 77 The disposition of property sec-
tions of many local authorizations provide that in determin-
ing fair market value, the local agency will give consideration
to the community improvement plan, the conditions and obli-
gations assumed by purchasers, and the objective of the pre-
vention of slums or blighted areas.78 If the constitutional
prohibition were construed to include both onerous and
gratuitous donations, allowing such considerations would be
unconstitutional, since to the extent the city receives less
than the fair market value in money, it has quoted the differ-
ence to the purchaser.
Legislative Considerations
In addition to having the constitutional capacity to do-
nate, a Louisiana city should also have the requisite author-
ity from the legislature. Legislation allowing municipalities
to sell property at public or private sale with no highest bid
requirement79 does not definitely indicate a legislative intent
to allow donations. However, specific statutory authority may
be unnecessary, since the 1974 constitution alters the previ-
ous relationship between state and local government by al-
lowing more autonomy to municipalities and limiting legisla-
tive interference in local affairs.8 0 "Home rule" authority is
sufficiently broad to permit any activity not constitutionally
75. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 207 in 10 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 314 (1969). LA. CIV. CODE art. 1524 lends further sup-
port to the notion that such transfers are not donations at all: "The onerous
donation is not a real donation, if the value of the object does not manifestly
exceed that of the charges imposed on the donee." See also Smith, A Re-
fresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REV. 2, 16 (1951).
76. State of Louisiana, Constitutional Convention of 1973 Verbatim
Transcripts, bk. XXXIII, 102d Day at 67-84, 104-07 (Dec. 17, 1973); Bk.
XXXVIII, 117th Day at 102-03 (Jan. 14, 1974).
77. See LA. R.S. 40:381.1 (1950).
78. See, e.g., La. Acts 1968, No. 224 § 9(a) (Baton Rouge City-Parish
Community Improvement Act of 1968)..
79. LA. R.S. 33:4712 (1950).
80. LA. CONST. art. VI §§ (5), (6). The traditional view was that local
governmental agencies were "creatures of the legislature." Pyle v. City of
Shreveport, 215 La. 257, 40 So. 2d 235 (1949).
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or statutorily prohibited, such as donations of property under
an urban homesteading program."'
If legislative authorization is found to be necessary,
urban renewal agencies having the authority to convey prop-
erty to private individuals on a basis other than highest bid,
could engage in an urban homesteading program. These
agencies can "mortgage, pledge, hypothecate, or otherwise
encumber or dispose of any real property"8' 2 on a basis of
reasonable bids and for not less than fair market value,
accepting "such proposal as it deems in the public interest
.... -83 As discussed above,8 4 the fair market value concept is
arguably broad enough to encompass an onerous donation of
the property.
Acquisition of Homestead Properties
The Louisiana tax sale8 5 will not prove a practicable
means for providing potential homestead properties.
Louisiana grants tax debtors three years in which to redeem
property sold for delinquent taxes.8 6 During the redemption
the city must keep any property adjudicated to it, s 7 thus
making its use in a homesteading program impractical. In
addition, few buildings are abandoned for tax delinquency
due to Louisiana's comparatively low tax rate.8 The receiv-
ership program does not offer a viable alternative. Although
New Orleans has a provision for making repairs to buildings
that are in violation of the housing code which allows assess-
ment of a special tax on the property to cover expenditures,8 9
the city has no authority to assume operation of the building
81. Kean, Local Government and Home Rule, 21 Loy. L. REV. 1, 66 (1975).
82. BATON ROUGE ACT § 6 (e).
83. LA. R.S. 33:4625(I)(2); BATON ROUGE ACT § 9(b).
84. See text at notes 73-78, supra.
85. LA. R.S. 47:2178-94 (1950). These provisions are applicable to
municipalities for the enforcement of municipal property taxes. LA. R.S.
33:2841 (1950).
86. LA. CONST. art. VII § 25(B).
87. LA. R.S. 47:2189 (1950). In Louisiana, the state and its subdivisions
cannot acquire full title by failure of the tax debtor to redeem as he is given a
right of redemption so long as the property is in the hands of the state. LA.
R.S. 47:2224 (1950). When the property is redeemed from an individual who
has bought the property at the tax sale, the tax debtor must pay for the
value of the improvements made upon the property. LA. R.S. 47:2222 (1950).
88. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LOUISIANA, PAR ANALYSIS:
PROPERTY TAX INEQUITIES, No. 176, Oct. 1971, at 4.
89. NEW ORLEANS CITY CODE § 30-12(2)(B).
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prior to foreclosure of the tax lien. Purchase by eminent do-
main, while possible, would require the expenditure of often
scarce local funds. Thus abandoned structures available from
HUD appear to provide the most immediately available prop-
erties in Louisiana. 90
Financial Assistance to Homesteaders
State or federal loans and grants are available for financ-
ing renovations. 91 Local urban renewal agencies may issue
bonds or borrow from private sources to raise funds for low-
interest rehabilitation loans to low and moderate income
homeowners. 92 Grants may be provided out of general rev-
enue sharing or other funds available to the local agency.93
Loan eligibility is based upon income, 94 but apparently no
income requirement exists for grants.9 5 The homesteader
could receive a loan for the maximum amount according to
his income and then a grant to insure that the value of his
rehabilitated house would exceed his outstanding indebted-
ness. The city would probably need to subordinate its right to
rescind to the mortgagee's privilege in order for the home-
steader to obtain a loan.9 6 The legislative provisions in
Louisiana providing for subsidies should insure participation
by lower income families willing to live in these areas. Addi-
90. See text at notes 34-38, supra. Local Property Release Option proper-
ties apparently will not be available, at least in Baton Rouge, since these
properties are still marketable. Letter from Thomas J. Armstrong, Director
of New Orleans Area Office, HUD, to W. W. Dumas, Mayor of Baton Rouge,
Louisiana (copy on file inthe offices of the Louisiana Law Review).
However, under the HUD Office of Policy Development and Research,
Preliminary Urban Homesteading Plan (a discussion document) at 2, a one-
time appropriation of 5 million dollars should mean that 1000 houses would
be available, and these houses, unlike those under the Local Property Re-
lease Option Program, need not be unmarketable. Letter from HUD Secre-
tary Carla Hills to W. W. Dumas, Mayor of Baton Rouge, Louisiana (copy
on file in the offices of the Louisiana Law Review).
91. See text at notes 42-45, supra.
92. LA. R.S. 33:4625, as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 660 § 1.
93. Id. at R(2).
94. Id. at R(3) (the annual income restrictions range from $8,400 for one
person to $13,700 for seven or more persons).
95. Id. at R(2).
96. Samuel Jackson, Washington, D.C., attorney and Chairman, National
Urban Coalition Task Force on Housing, Urban Growth and Transportation,
has noted the need for such subordination. NATIONAL URBAN COALITION,
URBAN HOMESTEADING: PROCESS AND POTENTIAL 47 (1974). See also NEW
ORLEANS PROPOSAL § 7.
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tionally, homestead exemption 9 7 eliminates the need for
financial assistance in the form of property tax relief.9 8
The Prospect of Homesteading
Urban homesteading attempts to combat abandonment of
inner city areas, called America's "new frontier,"99 through
homeownership, by encouraging families to resettle in and
maintain existing houses. Pride and independence, rather
than dependence, are fostered by homeownership. By con-
serving salvageable structures, homesteading provides an
economical alternative to expensive new construction. The
success of each program will be determined by whether mid-
dle income families are encouraged to remain in and return to
these areas. Smaller cities, such as Wilmington, Delaware,
where the social problems are less intense and the slum areas
not so large as to overwhelm the potential homesteader, offer
the low degree of risk-taking necessary to encourage middle
income participation. In general, Louisiana cities appear
more like Wilmington than like Philadelphia or Boston, thus
portending a greater probability of success. New Orleans,
though larger than Wilmington, does not suffer from wide-
spread abandonment as do other large older cities,1°° thus the
psychological barriers to middle class investment in inner city
neighborhoods are not as prevalent.
Conclusion
Homesteading in Louisiana appears best suited as a
specialized tool for revitalizing neighborhoods rather than for
resettling large abandoned areas. Problems may arise in
using the sale subject to redemption to transfer the property;
97. LA. CONST. art. VII § 20.
98. Most urban homestead programs include a tax abatement provision,
usually enacted in conjunction with the homestead program. Boston's pro-
gram contains built-in tax relief since the homesteader pays no taxes until
after he has received full title. See text at notes 37, 38, supra.
Philadelphia uses a more common approach by excluding all improve-
ments made during the homesteading period from the tax base. PHILADEL-
PHIA ORDINANCE § 6(J).
99. Coleman, The New Frontier in our Cities, Focus 4 (Joint Center for
Political Studies) (Nov. 1974). See M. STEGMANN, HOUSING INVESTMENT IN
THE INNER CITY: THE DYNAMICS OF DECLINE 57 (1972).
100. Linton, Mields & Coston, A Study of the Problems of Abandoned
Housing and Recommendations for Action by .the Federal Government and
Localities (Washington, D.C., 1971 mimeo) 166, 233.
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however, an innominate contract in which the obligation to
rehabilitate the property is included in the cause or consider-
ation may offer one solution to the objections to a sale. An
onerous donation affords another alternative, eliminating the
problem of "serious consideration," if the constitutional pro-
hibition against donations is interpreted to apply only to
gratuitous donations.
Louisiana's local urban renewal agencies seem uniquely
suited for the development and administration of such a
program,' 10 having the authority to dispose of the property
and to provide financial assistance. The agencies should con-
sider providing other forms of assistance, including central
purchasing and stockpiling of construction materials to re-
duce rehabilitation costs, technical assistance in the actual
reconstruction, and improved public facilities in the home-
steading area, counseling in repair and home management,
low-interest and long-term loans, tax abatement, and a
guarantee that the city will buy the house if no other buyer
can be found. 0 2 After an experimental project has studied in
operational form the practicality of a homesteading program
in Louisiana, the legislature could enact comprehensive legis-
lation detailing the requirements for the transfer of title and
any additional forms of assistance which may be found neces-
sary. Homesteading is an innovative idea which has sparked
enthusiasm 0 3 in restoring our inner city areas, and hopefully
Louisiana cities will experiment with it.
David R. Burch
101. New Orleans proposes to make its urban renewal agency, the Com-
munity Improvement Agency, the homesteading authority. NEW ORLEANS
PROPOSAL § 1.
102. So far no city has begun with such a comprehensive program, al-
though tax abatement and rehabilitation loans are becoming an increasingly
common feature in homesteading programs. Wedemeyer, Urban Homestead-
ing, NATION'S CITIES, 20, 21, Jan. 1975.
103. For the first ten houses distributed in Wilmington, there were one
hundred applicants from a broad cross-section of society. The Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 21, 1973 at 1, col. 1.
1975]
